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In Economics, as in any social science, empirical tests of theoretical results face a problem: 
researchers are unable to reproduce the whole economy (or at least its relevant parts) in 
their laboratories. Nowadays, Experimental Economics uses stylized experiments, drawing 
on the experience of Psychology, to test at least the basic assumptions of the economic 
theory of human behavior. Even classroom experiments may serve this purpose. This paper 
describes a simple classroom experiment that serves as an empirical test of Adam Smith’s 
invisible- hand hypothesis. Furthermore, it demonstrates to the students that competition 
acts as a discovery procedure. The experiment is of high didactical value, since the stu-
dents gain insights into empirical research and experience how markets work.   
JEL-Classification: A20, D40 
Keywords: Hayek-Hypothesis, Efficiency, Double Oral Auctions  
 
Die empirische Prüfung theoretischer Forschungsergebnisse wirft in der Ökonomie - wie 
bei jeder Sozialwissenschaft – Probleme auf. Anders als in den Naturwissenschaften kön-
nen volkswirtschaftliche Problemstellungen kaum in Labors nachgestellt werden. Seit eini-
gen Jahren nutzen Ökonomen allerdings die Erfahrungen der Psychologie mit stilisierten 
Experimenten, um zumindest ihre grundlegenden Verhaltenshypothesen testen zu können. 
Dieser Beitrag stellt ein einfaches Hörsaal-Experiment vor, das Adam Smiths Hypothese 
von der „unsichtbaren Hand“ im Marktgeschehen empirisch überprüft. Das Experiment 
zeigt zudem, wie Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren funktioniert, und besitzt hohen 
didaktischen Wert: Die Studenten erhalten Einblick in empirische Forschung und erleben 
hautnah das Funktionieren des Marktes. 
 
                                                 
* Assistant professor of Economics and corresponding author. Research on this paper was finished while I 
enjoyed the hospitality of the Economics Department of the University of California in Santa Barbara. I am 
grateful to Jennifer Brown (UCSB) for helping to improve our use of the English language.  
§ Professor of Economics.   2 
1. Self-interest and general wealth 
 
The Scottish moral philosopher and founding father of economics Adam Smith made, in 
his famous work “The Wealth of Nations”, an assertion about this new discipline that even 
nowadays may sound strange and auspicious to outsiders. Its starting point is the realiza-
tion that humans act out of self-interest, thus that no one should rely on the benevolence of 
others: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we ex-
pect our dinner, but from their regard of their own interest. We address ourselves not to 
their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our necessities, but of their 
advantage.” (Smith, A. 1776/1911, 13). If every economic agent pursues his own interests, 
chaos and anarchy do not follow. To the contrary, the participants will achieve the greatest 
wealth as if an “invisible hand” guided them. It is not required for them to have this spe-
cific goal in mind, as Smith has pointed out: “… every individual ... neither intends to 
promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it ....he intends only his 
own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an 
end which was no part of his intention.” (Smith, A. 1776/1911, 400) 
Thus, for Adam Smith self-interest (and not altruism) is the driving force for the general 
economic wealth and efficiency. Smith was even extremely skeptical towards agents who 
proclaimed to have nothing but the common good in mind: “I have never known much 
good done by those who affected to trade for the public good”. Rather the opposite is true, 
according to Smith, because an economic actor, by “pursuing his own interest ... frequently 
promotes  that  of  society  more  effectually  than  when  he  really  intends  to  promote  it”
  
(Smith, A. 1776/1911, 400). The connection between egoism and efficiency is based on the 
mutual benefit derived from voluntary trade: the exchange of goods is not a zero sum 
game, since both sides receive a share of the profit. Otherwise, such a transaction would 
not take place. Although everyone tries to gain the greatest possible part of the gains from 
trade, the interaction brings about general economic efficiency.  
Modern Economics has rephrased the “invisible hand”-hypothesis as the “First Theorem of 
Welfare-Economics”: competitive equilibria are Pareto-efficient. The welfare of a society 
is maximal when all possibilities for trade are exhausted. Then, all goods and resources are 
in the hands of those who value them most. This is equivalent to maximizing the sum of 
consumer- and producer-rent, called the social surplus. The seminal contributions of Wal-
ras (1954/1874) and Arrow/Debreu (1954) did more than only transfer the idea of the in-
visible hand into the language of modern microeconomics. Their works have also clarified   3 
that the invisible hand is not purely utopian. In the framework of a general equilibrium 
model, it is at least a theoretical possibility. Assume individuals to decide autonomously, to 
maximize utility and to have a decentralized knowledge about valuation, technologies and 
resource endowments. For the competitive equilibrium to yield efficient coordination, it is 
only required that the participants are aware of the price system.  
However, this theory has difficulty explaining how competition brings about equilibrium 
prices. The solution was the invention of the “Walrasian” auctioneer, who brings the mar-
kets into equilibrium by announcing price vectors and comparing the supply and demand. 
Still, this explanation leaves unanswered how the competition process in reality leads to 
equilibrium prices.
1 It was in particular the Nobel laureate in Economics, Friedrich August 
von  Hayek,  who  emphasized  this  dynamic  aspect  of  the  “invisible  hand”-hypothesis 
(Hayek 1952). In a spontaneous order,
2 the “market” is a self-organizing system in which 
the  invisible  hand  regulates  prices  via  negative  feedback.  Competition,  as  a  discovery 
procedure, creates “a kind of order of which the equilibrium is a kind of idealized type” 
(Hayek 1969, 256). In the process of competition, prices do not only accomplish coordina-
tion (as in a general  equilibrium model), but also serve as  an instrument of discovery 
(Kirzner 1985).  
Moreover, modern Economics has pointed out that unfettered self-interest is not a suffi-
cient prerequisite for maximizing the welfare of a society. The rules of the economic sys-
tem play a decisive role determining whether self-interest promotes wealth or turns against 
the interests of the society.
3 The competitive order, as a non-authoritarian system of social 
control, is supposed to limit abuses of freedom. Economic theory has formulated several 
standard reasons for limiting the egoism of individuals. Problems like environmental pollu-
tion and asymmetric information are just two prominent examples. Nonetheless, Smith’s 
assumption continues to pose a challenge for modern economics: Is it merely a conjecture, 
or rather a valid prediction?  
                                                 
1 The general equilibrium theory has been criticized by the “Austrian Economics” for not giving the creative 
entrepreneur any room. Makowski/Ostroy (2001) have attempted to rephrase the theory by considering the 
possibility that agents could create new markets. 
2 According to a famous phrase of David Hume, a spontaneous order is the result of human action, but not of 
human design. 
3 This is the reason why Smith (1982b, 924) defines a “microeconomic system” as a combination of an envi-
ronment (agents, their utility, available resources) and an institution, which defines the rules under which   4 
In theory, it is possible to derive efficient equilibria, using rather heroic assumptions such 
as an ideally organized market, complete information about all trade options, and the abil-
ity of all participating individuals to compute with infinite velocity, as well as the absence 
(or internalization) of all external effects. Based on these prerequisites, the connection be-
tween self-interest and efficiency as postulated by Smith is a prediction. In reality, how-
ever, situations that fulfill these prerequisites are scarce. Thus, economic research should 
busy  itself  with  determining  whether  such  a  prediction  can  remain  valid  even  under 
“weaker” assumptions. 
This article presents an experiment as an example for a system of rules that does not fulfill 
the strict requirements of perfect equilibrium theory. Even though, this competition order 
has encouraged the self-interested participants to behave in a wealth-maximizing way. The 
experiment illustrates the coordination- as well as the discovery effect of the price system. 
It shows how market participants create order even without the existence of a “Walrasian 
Auctioneer”. We will use the competition equilibrium as a reference point according to 
Hayek (1952, 63): “Regardless of what might occasionally have been said by all to ‘pure’ 
theoreticians of economics, there seems to be no doubts that the only justification is the 
assumed tendency towards equilibrium. Only by stating that such a tendency exists does 
economics stop being a purely logical exercise and becomes an empirical science.” 
Section 2 gives a general description of the classroom experiment. Section 3 presents the 
sequence of events and the results of the experiment. Section 4 evaluates the observations. 
In section 5, we will interpret the results in light of the theory of competition as a discovery 
procedure. Section 6 is the conclusion.   
 
2. The experiment 
 
We have conducted repeated classroom experiments with students of the University of 
Saarland to test empirically Adam Smiths “invisible hand” prognosis. The experimental 
economist and Nobel laureate Vernon Smith has conducted similar experiments decades 
ago, see Smith (1962). The design of our experiment followed, with the necessary modifi-
                                                                                                                                                    
agents can communicate and exchange. The experiment described in the next section sets up a microeco-
nomic system in this sense.    5 
cations, the standard work of Davis and Holt (1993).
4 The conclusion of the surprised par-
ticipants: The “invisible hand” actually works.  
The participants of this experiment were supposed to trade with a good, which was pur-
posely not specified. This avoided the influence of personal tastes and distastes, which 
might have subconsciously played a role, had the traded good of the experiment have been, 
for example, chocolate or oranges. The participants were divided into 12 teams. Half of the 
teams were given two units of the goods each; this was the group of sellers. The other half 
of the teams constituted the group of buyers who wanted to buy up to two units of the 
goods. Subsequently, we refer to the teams as if they were individual players. All prices, 
costs and valuations were stated in “Marks”, the German currency before the introduction 
of the Euro. Two Marks are about one Euro or one US Dollar.  
Each seller was given a sheet that indicated his costs for the two units in his possession. 
This information was to be kept secret from the other groups. It was explained that these 
costs had to be taken into consideration in his individual calculations. If a seller had to con-
sider three Marks for his first unit, then he could only make a profit if he sold that unit for 
more than three Marks. These costs constituted for the seller his minimum willingness to 
accept (reservation price of the seller). If he was able to sell for a price of five Marks, then 
he made a profit of two Marks.  
Accordingly, each buyer was told what utility, expressed in money, he valued the good at. 
This valuation set for the buyer his maximum willingness to buy, i.e., the reservation price 
of the buyer. If the buyer valued the good at nine Marks, and this unit was traded at five 
Marks, then his profit accrued to four Marks. The realized profits of the buyer- and seller 
teams were paid in cash at the end of the game. 
Table 1 shows the complete information of the costs and valuations of all participants. 
These values make operational the term “general economic welfare”: the gauge for the 
welfare of the participants is given by the difference between utility and costs, insofar as 
trade takes place. E.g., should buyer E purchase his first unit from seller 3 (who therefore 
relinquishes his first unit), then this transaction creates a surplus of 4.20 Marks, thus 10.80 
Marks utility minus 6.60 Marks costs.  
A fundamental criticism with such experiments in economics is that the experimentalists 
assign valuations and costs to the participants, while such predetermination might not re-
                                                 
4 Therefore we do not present the instructions here. They are (in German language) available from the au-
thors.    6 
flect the actual motivation of the participants. This criticism however, is not applicable to 
our experiment, since the monetary outcome each participant gains only depends on the 
predetermined costs and valuation. Thus, the participants are exclusively motivated by the 
goal of making an individual profit by concluding a transaction, if this is advantageous 
with respect to their predetermined reservation prices.
5  
 
Table 1: Valuations and costs  
 
Buyer  1. Unit  2. Unit 
A  8.40  8.40 
B  9.00  7.80 
C  9.60  7.20 
D  10.20  6.60 
E  10.80  6.00 
F  11.40  5.40 
Seller  1. Unit  2. Unit 
1  7.80  8.40 
2  7.20  9.00 
3  6.60  9.60 
4  6.00  10.20 
5  5.40  10.80 
6  4.80  7.80 
 
If a buyer and a seller conclude a transaction, then a transaction rent is created. The trans-
action  rent  consists  of  the  respective  buyer’s  willingness  to  buy,  net  of  the  respective 
seller’s reservation price. The efficient solution is reached when the sum of transaction 
rents is maximized. In the experimental situation, efficiency requires that all sellers sell 
their first unit and seller 6 additionally sells his second unit. Furthermore, all buyers must 
buy their respective first unit, and buyer A additionally his second unit. This can easily be 
ascertained when one transforms table 1 into a market diagram. The horizontal axis of fig-
ure 1 shows units, the vertical axis shows the participants’ reservation prices in Marks per 
unit. The reservation prices of the sellers are drawn as an ascending stair function (dashed), 
the buyers’ valuations as a declining stair function (solid). When the participants trade 
seven units, then they are realizing the maximum possible social surplus. All potential ob-
tainable gains from trade are realized then. In order to reach the optimal solution it is ir-
relevant which Buyer- and Seller teams come together to participate in transactions. 
                                                 
5 Plott (1982) points out that market experiments do not only represent simulations of real-world markets. 
The situation in the laboratory is a real market. Thus, the observed behavior of the participants is behavior in 
a real market. However, the question remains unanswered to what extent the pattern of behavior in one mar-  7 
 
Figure 1 about here  
 
The ascending curve in figure 1 looks like the usual supply curve and the declining one 
looks like a demand curve. However, for this experiment, such an interpretation would be 
erroneous.  In  traditional  microeconomic  theory,  the  derivation  of  supply-  and  demand 
curves is based on the assumption of price taking behavior. However, the participants in 
this experiment are not passive but rather set the prices through their bidding and accepting 
behavior.
6 Textbook microeconomics assumes that all transactions are conducted at the 
same price. This experiment differs from such an ideal solution in the sense that transac-
tions can indeed be made at varying prices. In each transaction, the price is set through the 
participants. One market side suggests a price and one participant of the other market side 
accepts it, thereby concluding a transaction.  
If one could interpret the curves of figure 1 as supply- and demand curves of price takers in 
a perfect market, then the traditional micro-economics would not only predict that the effi-
cient volume (seven units) would be traded in equilibrium, but would also make a predic-
tion about the price. The equilibrium price, at which all seven units of the goods would be 
traded would lie between 7.80 und 8.40 Marks. The equilibrium price, due to the 0.60-
Mark leaps in the valuations and costs can only be given as an interval;
7 in an “atomistic” 
market with continuous valuations and costs, an exact prediction of a single price could be 
derived. The predicted price-quantity combination is represented in figure 1 by a dotted 
line. We refer to this price interval as the “equilibrium interval”. Furthermore, we call the 
combination of the equilibrium interval and the welfare-maximizing amount the “reference 
allocation”.  
Should a central planner want to determine the optimal volume (and perhaps even the op-
timal unit price) for this market at his desk, then he would require all of the information 
contained in table 1. It is here that he would encounter two problems: On the one hand, he 
                                                                                                                                                    
ket provides a sound foundation for making predictions about the behavior (of different actors) in other mar-
kets.  
6Here one can see a parallelism between the double-oral auction and the rephrasing of the general equilibrium 
theory by Makowski/Ostroy (2001). They also assume that the market participants are not price takers, but 
actively shape the prices.  
7 In Smith (1962, 113), the equilibrium price is unique, but not the quantity. As in our experiment, Ruffle 
(2003, 132) has assumed a market where the equilibrium quantity is unique, but not the market price. How-
ever, his experiment is not based on a double-oral auction.   8 
would have to get the buyer and the seller to reveal their valuations and costs truthfully. In 
practical terms however, merely identifying the agents and their roles already presents a 
problem, not to mention accessing their arcane knowledge. Nevertheless, even if the plan-
ner could gain this information, he had to deal with more than one market. The attempt to 
generate optimal plans for the several million markets of an economy is doomed to failure 
from the beginning.
8  
The participants of our experiment knew neither the valuations nor the costs of the other 
teams; communication between the teams was strictly prohibited. The only information 
available to the teams was their own valuation or costs, respectively. Furthermore, they 
could conclude from the description of the experiment that there must be agents on the 
other side of the market, but they were unable to infer the other teams’ identities or their 
number. Table 2 consists of an excerpt of table 1 and shows, as an example, the informa-
tion available to the buyers team C. Thus, the relevant economic knowledge in table 1 is 
decentralized. With his available information, no single participant could derive the so-
cially optimal solution, even if he attempted to.  
 
Table 2: Available information of team C 
 
Buyer  1. Unit  2. Unit 
C  9.60  7.20 
 
The  experimental  question  is  as  follows:  Can  the  market  coordinate  the  decentralized 
knowledge efficiently? Another way of posing this question would be, does the interaction 
of self-interested participants approximate the socially optimal solution?  
The game consisted of two trade periods of 10 minutes each. In each period, the partici-
pants could make as many offers as they pleased. There was only one condition: up until 
the conclusion of a transaction, the offers of the sellers had to be lower and those of the 
buyers had to be higher than the previous offers of the same market side.
9 Only after a 
                                                 
8 These are the problems that Hayek had already indicated in his essay from 1945 “The Use of Knowledge in 
Society”. The collapse of the socialistic, centrally planned economies about 15 years ago gave impressive 
proof of Hayek’s thesis. A further problem is addressed by Public Choice theory, namely the incentives of 
the central planner to carry out his function.    
9 In later runs of the experiment, we dropped this rule. The outcomes did not differ substantially – the partici-
pants also traded almost efficiently, with transaction prices from within the reference interval or in its vicin-  9 
transaction was concluded, the next offer could be freely made. The experimentalist-team 
remained completely passive, not interfering in the operation of the market. We limited our 
activities to writing a protocol of the offers and concluded transactions on the blackboard, 
and we ensured that the participants obeyed the rules of the experiment. A computer could 
have easily done this task. Thus, no (Walrasian) Auctioneer was active, and the creation of 
prices resulted solely from the interaction of the participants.  
 
3. The course of trade 
 
During the experiment, the participants did not instantaneously “pounce” – contrary to 
textbook microeconomics – into the optimal solution. Rather they slowly groped towards 
it. The transaction prices were formed because of overbidding by the sellers and underbid-
ding by the buyers. Market participants felt their way towards the price at which the trans-
action then finally took place. This was impressively observable from the list of the events 
during the first trading period. It started with the opening bid of a seller: for 25 Marks, 
team 1 would be willing to relinquish one unit of the good. The first counteroffer of the 
buyer team D seemed rather humble in contrast: only 0.50 Mark (see table 3).  
 
Table 3: First round of the first trading period 
 
1. Trading period       
Buyer  Seller 
D  0.50  1  25.00 
C  7.50  6  11.00 
A  7.70     
C  8.00  2  accepted 
 
 
The next offer of the buyer team C, 7.50 Marks, already reached the theoretically predicted 
price range. The somewhat more active buyer side had to make two more offers before the 
first trade at 8 Marks took place. This contract price falls within the theoretically predicted 
equilibrium interval. 
After the experiences of the first round, the other buyer-teams became active, too. The 
sellers simply waited until the buyers quickly bartered their way up to the sales price of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
ity. The bidding process, however, took longer and did oscillated more erratically around the equilibrium 
interval.    10 
first round. In the second and third round, the only offer made by a seller received no atten-
tion; two units in a row changed their owners at the price of 8 Marks, as indicated in table 
4. The upper portion of this table shows the events of the second round, the shaded portion 
shows the third round, and the bottom portion refers to the fourth round. The transaction 
price of 8 Marks seems to have established itself as a standard, for in the fourth round the 
buyer-side began with this offer. However, a higher transaction price was reached here, 
namely 9 Marks. Note that this price lies above the theoretically predicted price interval. 
 
Table 4: First trading period, second through fourth round 
 
Buyer  Seller 
B  5.00     
C  5.50     
D  8.00  6  accepted 
F  5.00  4  11.00 
C  5.50     
F  7.00     
E  8.00  3  accepted 
B  8.00  2  15.00 
F  accepted  1  9.00 
 
There was a fierce contest for the fifth unit. Both market sides groped their way towards 
each other in tiny steps. Altogether, teams A and B on the buyer-side and teams 4 and 6 on 
the seller-side called out 15 price suggestions before a transaction was  concluded at 8 
Marks, a price which falls again within the theoretical interval (table 5, upper part). Teams 
A and 6 concluded round six amongst themselves, again at the price of 8 Marks (table 5, 
shaded part).  
 
Table 5: First trading period, fifth and sixth round 
 
Buyer  Seller 
A  7.00  4  9.50 
B  7.20  6  9.00 
A  7.40  4  8.90 
B  7.50  6  8.50 
A  7.60  4  8.40 
B  7.70  6  8.30 
A  7.80  4  8.20 
B  8.00  4  accepted 
C  6.00  5  10.00 
B  7.50  6  8.10 
A  7.70  6  8.00 
A  7.80     
A  accepted     
   11 
Surprisingly, the first trading period ended without any further transaction. Even though 
further gains from trade would have been obtainable and the last three offers of the buyers 
were still within the reference-interval, the sellers seemed to take a time-out (see table 6). 
The ringing of the bell ended the prevailing silence and announced the end to the first trad-
ing period. After a short break the second trading period began, which was conducted in 
similar manner as the first.  
 
Table 6: First trading period, seventh round 
 
Buyer  Seller 
F  5.00  2  11.00 
B  6.00  5  9.00 
C  6.50  5  8.50 
B  7.00 
C  7.10 
B  7.50 
A  7.80 
A  8.00 









4. Evaluation of the experiment  
 
The transaction prices of both trading periods are summarized in table 7. Additionally, 
table 7 comprises the valuations and costs, which allows us to compute the transaction rent 
realized by each of the concluded transactions. The observed transactions are an impres-
sive confirmation of the optimal functioning of the invisible hand. Deviation from the so-
cially  efficient  amount,  namely  7  units,  could  have  taken  place  above  or  below  that 
amount. The actual amount that was traded in each of the two periods was six units. Aside 
from two exceptions, the transaction prices were actually within the reference-interval: in 
the fourth round of the first period, team F paid 9 Marks, and in the third round of the sec-
ond period, the same team paid 8.50 Marks. The most common transaction price was 8 
Marks. 
The reference allocation, whereby seven units traded for prices between 7.80 und 8.40 
Marks, was deduced under the condition of an ideally organized market. In the experimen-
tal situation, however, one condition was violated, namely that all participants have com-
plete information about all trading options. The buyers and sellers hence had to determine 
by themselves, through the process of bidding and spontaneous order, what the efficient   12 
allocation was. It is therefore quite remarkable that the competition between the partici-
pants, even in this imperfect situation, nearly lead to the efficient result.
10  
Table 7: Transactions in both trading periods 
 
Unit  Buyer  Valuation  Seller  Cost  Transaction rent  Transaction price 
1.  C  9.60  2  7.20  2.40  8.00 
2.  D  10.20  6  4.80  5.40  8.00 
3.  E  10.80  3  6.60  4.20  8.00 
4.  F  11.40  1  7.80  3.60  9.00 
5.  B  9.00  4  6.00  3.00  8.00 
6.  A  8.40  6  7.80  0.60  8.00 
Sum of benefits in 1. transaction period  19.20   
1.  C  9.60  2  7.20  2.40  8.20 
2.  D  10.20  6  4.80  5.40  8.40 
3.  F  11.40  4  6.00  5.40  8.50 
4.  A  8.40  3  6.60  1.80  8.00 
5.  E  10.80  6  7.80  3.00  8.30 
6.  B  9.00  5  5.40  3.60  8.40 
Sum of benefits in 2. transaction period  21.60   
 
 
In both periods, the seventh unit could still have been traded: The last offers of the buyer-
side were at 8.10 Marks in the first period and 8.30 Marks in the second period, respec-
tively. By selling at this price, it would have been possible to make a profit for team 5 in 
the first period and team 1 in the second period. Team 5 valued their first unit with only 
5.40 Marks and could therefore have made a profit of 2.70 Marks, had they accepted the 
last offer of buyer A. However, the ringing of the bell impeded any further possible (and 
bilaterally profitable) transaction, so that team 5 left the first period empty-handed. In the 
second period, it was team 1 which did not agree to trade with A, even though such trade 
would have been bilaterally profitable.  
In both periods the seller-teams were marked by a wait and see behavior – most offers 
were made by the buyers. This observation would deserve a closer study. Should partici-
pants in future runs exhibit this behavior again, then that would be a reason to seek a theo-
retical explanation. This theory would require a focused empirical testing in new experi-
ments.  
                                                 
10 This is not to claim that spontaneous order always leads to optimal results. Moreover, it is possible to de-
rive the theoretical equilibrium result for an ideally organized market; it is still an unsolved problem how to 
derive a game theoretical equilibrium for the double-oral auction game presented in this experiment. There-
fore, we are unable to test experimentally a theoretical prediction of the participants’ behavior. The experi-
ment, however, allows for testing whether the participants bring about an efficient outcome.     13 
 
5. Competition as a discovery procedure 
 
Economic theory often defines competition in terms of price-taking behavior. However, 
the “Austrian” school interprets competition rather as a market process, which leads to-
wards equilibrium, see Kirzner (1997). Our experiment demonstrates how competition, on 
the one hand, operates as a parallel process of two interlocking sequences of bidding: the 
overbidding by the buyers, and the underbidding by the sellers. The process of price build-
ing is a discovery procedure based on negative feedback (Hayek 1978, 184). On the other 
hand, competition operates as an exchange process that leads to a series of transactions; the 
process of price finding serves here as a coordination procedure.  
The competition processes in the experiment lead to dispersed knowledge being used as if 
it were available at a central authority. This is what Vernon Smith (1982a) has called the 
“Hayek-Hypothesis”: “Strict privacy together with the trading rules of a market institution 
are sufficient to produce ... near 100 % efficiency”.
 This hypothesis is related to Hayek’s 
interpretation of competition as a “discovery procedure”. Hayek pointed out that “...it is 
salutary to remember that, wherever the use of competition can be rationally justified, it is 
on the ground that we do not know in advance the facts that determine the actions of com-
petitors” (Hayek 1978, 179, italics in the original). Hayek proposed “...to consider compe-
tition as a procedure of such facts as, without resort to it, would not be known to anyone, 
or at least would not be utilized” (Hayek 1978, 179).  
As the organizers of the experiment, we knew the essential facts, namely the parties’ re-
spective costs and valuations. In the position of a central planner, we could have used this 
superior knowledge to simply dictate the market equilibrium (and, thus, allocate seven 
units in both periods). However, such knowledge of outsiders is not the subject of Hayek’s 
verdict. It is important to keep the purpose of this experiment in mind. Adam Smith and 
Hayek assigned welfare-increasing attributes to competition. Thus, competition does not 
only reveal what it reveals; rather, it discovers what is desirable. It exposes to the partici-
pants the existing options for an efficient coordination of their plans.  
If Hayek’s hypothesis, according to which competition discovers what is socially optimal, 
claims to be a scientific statement, then it must be empirically testable. This is what our   14 
experiment shows: Hayek’s hypothesis is in fact empirically testable and thus falsifiable.
11 
The experiment could have produced a result deviating far from the efficient equilibrium 
derived by traditional price theory. Given the relatively simple circumstances (only trade, 
not production) of the experimental situation, one would have to be skeptical about the 
validity of this hypothesis if it had been falsified in this simple environment, since real-
world markets are even more complex.
12 This falsification, however, has failed. Therefore, 
we can infer that at least those real-world markets in which the rules of the experiment 
apply produce nearly efficient results, even if the information remains decentralized.
13 Of 
course, this insight does not provide yet positive proof that the Hayek hypothesis would 
also be true with respect to more complex markets in the real world.  
Our experiment provided a further insight. It demonstrated that the market participants 
brought about another end even though no one was consciously aiming towards this: com-
petition induced them to keep each other in check. Thus, the market functioned as a system 
of social control that is not organized by authorities. Who ever tried to increase his own 
payoff had to offer the other market-side a better trade opportunity than his competitors. At 
the same time, each participant expected the other participants to be profit maximizing, 
too, which made their behaviors more predictable for all participants.  
Furthermore, the participants went through a learning process. They observed the results of 
the previous rounds and knew that the other teams had the same experiences. This observa-
tion led us to a new research hypothesis which might explain why the contract-price of 8 
Marks was the most common, even though the theory does not prefer any of the prices 
between 7,80 and 8,40 Marks. Having observed that 8 Marks was the contract price in the 
first rounds may have increased the participants’ willingness, in the following rounds, to 
                                                 
11 This only applies to the non-trivial interpretation; the trivial interpretation (“competition reveals what it 
reveals”) shields itself from any possibility of falsification. 
12 Evidence for the validity of the Hayek hypothesis has also been found with respect to interdependent mar-
kets and to changes in the exogenous data through experiments. Furthermore, experiments show that monop-
oly positions deliver the theoretically predicted results; see. Smith, V. (2000). The participants were not just 
in a static, but also a dynamic and changing environment: every transaction causes a change in the constella-
tion of figure 1. Thus the result, that the participants approximated the reference situation of an ideally organ-
ized market, becomes all the more important. 
13 See the similar inference in Plott (2000).   15 
agree to this contract price again.
14 This hypothesis is in need of further theoretic work and 




The introduced experiment is not just a test of Adam Smiths hypothesis that egoism and 
competition can promote general welfare. Beyond its research value, the classroom ex-
periment has a high didactic value.
15 On the one hand, it offers students the chance to par-
ticipate directly in an empirical study. On the other hand, they can see how information, 
even though decentralized, can be made useful through the market mechanism. They ob-
serve how a result is achieved that no individual could have planned or realized. The stu-
dents discover first hand how the market economy works. Enthusiastic participation of all 
teams and the excitement during the final rounds of both trading periods showed that even 
in an experimental situation the hope for mere pennies was able to influence substantially 
the behavior of the participants.  
 
                                                 
14 See Plott/Williamson (2000) for an experiment on embedded games, where each transaction is embedded 
into a larger game.  
15 Wells (1991) gives a general introduction into the use of experiments and classroom activities in teaching 
economics. Recent examples for very useful classroom experiments are Bodo (2002) on the prisoners’ di-
lemma, Dickinson (2002) on bargaining and fairness, and Eckalbar (2002) on duopoly markets. The Journal 
of Economic Perspectives contains a section (“Classroom Games”) that presents simple experiments covering 
different fields of Economics, e.g., see Holt/Laury (1997).    16 
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Figure 1: Reservation prices of buyers and sellers 
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